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Since toppling the authoritarian Ben Ali regime in 2011, 
Tunisia has made remarkable strides toward a democratic 
political system. Tunisia has climbed from the classifica-
tion of a “hard-line autocracy” in 2010 to being ranked 
in 2016 a “defective democracy” – not least due to the 
exercise of multiple free and fair elections.2 The 2015 
Nobel Peace Prize went to a quartet of Tunisian civil soci-
ety organizations in recognition of their contribution to 
the country’s transition. International enthusiasm about 
these developments is justified: The Tunisian experi-
ence challenges culturalist arguments about a supposed 
incompatibility of Arab and Islamic culture with liberal 
democracy. It also suggests the ability of democratic po-
litical systems to integrate Islamist political forces. 
But, as a fresh wave of protests in January 2018 dem-
onstrated powerfully, these advances are vulnerable 
because many Tunisians have yet to experience tangible 
democracy dividends. In over a dozen towns and cities, 
protestors vented their anger over the 2018 budget with 
its subsidy cuts and tax hikes. There is a widely shared 
sentiment that the economic injustices of the Ben Ali era 
that motivated the revolution have not yet been tackled. 
When it comes to consolidating democratic progress, 
the challenges Tunisia faces can be conceptualized in 
a “triangle of threat.” Security problems, lack of socio-
economic development and persistent corruption are 
interlinked and reinforce each other in a triangle of threat 
which undermines confidence in the new political order. 
Within this triangle, endemic corruption (which includes 
clientelism) is worth particular attention. Actors in and 
outside Tunisia who want to support its democratic transi-
tion should focus on anti-corruption measures.
In the Triple Threat to Tunisia’s Democracy, 
Corruption is King 
Fabian Stroetges1 
As austerity protestors clash with security forces in Tunisia, the country’s young de-
mocracy is threatened by a triple challenge: Insecurity, a lack of socioeconomic de-
velopment and persistent corruption are interlinked and reinforce each other. Individu-
ally and in concert they undermine citizens’ confidence in the democratic system and 
hamper its ability to produce democracy dividends. Corruption is the most pernicious 
of these three phenomena and improvements here could translate into tangible gains 
in the two other areas. To support Tunisian democracy, the European Union and its 
member states should therefore put a greater emphasis on anti-corruption efforts. 
Prime Minister Youssef Chahed’s “war on corruption” provides a timely opportunity 
for this. But the window of opportunity can close quickly with a change of govern-
ment. Thus, beside redoubling their efforts and making them sustainable, Europe 
should also develop policy options for a Tunisian political environment less open to 
anti-corruption cooperation.
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The failure of the new political system to tackle issues 
that were key triggers of the 2010-11 revolution gnaws at 
its legitimacy. The two national unity governments that 
followed the tense transition have yet to produce signifi-
cant socioeconomic improvements, adequate security, 
and good and effective governance. At about 1 percent, 
economic growth is too low to improve the poor employ-
ment numbers, which have barely changed since the revo-
lution. Joblessness stands at 15 percent nationally, but the 
figure is almost double that in the long-neglected interior 
regions and even higher for youth (35.7 percent). For a 
time, the poor performance could be blamed on external 
shocks such as the economic fallout from the 2010-11 revo-
lution and subsequent terror attacks, after which tourism 
collapsed. But in the meantime, succeeding governments 
did not muster the political will to tackle serious struc-
tural problems. Instead of using the legitimacy of their 
broad-based constituencies that include the major politi-
cal players, the latter have largely blocked each other in 
the governments of national unity.
While foreign and domestic private investors are de-
terred by a bloated bureaucracy and high business costs, 
the Tunisian government does not channel its own funds 
into badly needed public investment. A consequence of 
the political standstill, roughly 80 percent of the gov-
ernment’s budget is spent on civil servants and interest 
payments. Politicians have yet to take on comprehensive 
civil service reform, effective tax collection from the self-
employed, and a policy on the buoyant informal sector. 
Under the state of emergency – triggered in reaction to a 
series of terrorist attacks – reports of abuse and torture at 
the hands of the security forces have increased. Further-
more, the parliament’s failure to agree on details of the 
constitutional court and other constitutionally mandated 
institutions meant that deadlines for their creation have 
been missed – in part by the same parliamentarians that 
set the deadlines. 
Corruption and Confidence in the State 
With the exception of the army, trust in public institutions 
is low. Most Tunisians feel that ministries and members 
of parliament work for themselves rather than the public. 
Young Tunisians feel particularly poorly catered to.3 
According to polling conducted in late 2014, corruption 
was “by far the single most frequent reason [for protests 
in 2011] in four of six countries”, featuring particularly 
prominently in Tunisia.4 Worryingly, 90 percent of Tuni-
sian respondents in the 2016 Arab Barometer still said that 
corruption “pervades” government.5 A high number of 
companies report of having to make informal payments 
to “speed things up”.6 
Corruption is more than an expensive inconvenience. 
It is in fact the key challenge to consolidating Tunisia’s 
democratic progress. Insecurity, lack of development, 
and corruption form a triangle in which each component 
adversely affects the other. But of the three, corruption is 
the most corrosive to democracy. Endemic corruption un-
dermines the system’s values, but also has real, direct and 
indirect, impact on security and the potential deliverables 
of a political and economic system.  
In terms of socioeconomic development, corruption 
deters domestic and foreign investment and hampers eco-
nomic growth: In a system with high transaction costs, it 
is the businesses with the right contacts that thrive, rather 
than the most competitive ones. By undermining the rule 
of law – a key component of a democratic state and guar-
antor of fair market competition – this effect is even exac-
erbated.7 As public resources are diverted to private gain, 
public services become more expensive to obtain, while 
their quality and availability suffers. Corruption is thus 
a barrier to citizens’ opportunity to claim the very rights 
– including social and economic ones – that a democratic 
system ought to guarantee.
Security is affected in two main ways: Clearly, when 
security forces and the justice system are prone to cor-
ruption, law enforcement is less effective and offenders 
with connections or money can go unpunished. But, as 
researcher and journalist Sarah Chayes has outlined, by 
scarring the dignity of participants, corruption also feeds 
the appeal of extremist groups whose narrative often 
includes the establishment of a more just, corruption-free 
society.8
Insecurity also increases business costs, further under-
mining economic development. For example, in 2013-14, 
over two thirds of Tunisian businesses payed for security, 
about double the average in the MENA region and well 
above the global average of 55.5 percent.9 Finally, in an 
environment of stagnant socioeconomic development and 
fragile security, citizens may be more inclined to engage 
in corrupt practices – if only out of necessity. The triple 
threat of insecurity, lack of development and corruption 
thus adversely affect one another. However, corruption is 
the most pernicious to democracy because it undermines 
democracy’s very ideals along with its deliverables. 
Change Expectations, Check Corruption
Security and economics cannot be ignored, but given 
the key impact of corruption on citizens’ confidence in 
the state and its strong linkage to the other two factors, a 
successful fight against corruption promises significant 
rewards for the consolidation of Tunisia’s democracy. 
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There is wide consensus among academics and policy-
makers that structural factors such as high levels of 
transparency and accountability in the public and private 
sectors, strong market competition, and low rents for 
discretionary distribution contribute to an environment 
of low corruption. Beyond that, researchers have concep-
tualized endemic corruption as a particular equilibrium 
of expectations: Both sides of a transaction have well-es-
tablished and unspoken assumptions about what consti-
tutes appropriate behavior in a transaction and what is 
expected from them by the other. For example, both law 
enforcement officers and citizens would expect that pass-
ing a bribe is part of a traffic stop and behave accordingly. 
To change expectations and move toward a system of 
low corruption, many researchers suggest that the most 
promising approach is a revolutionary “big bang”10 that 
would introduce radical uncertainty for those seeking to 
engage in corrupt practices. After this, traffic cops and 
citizens can no longer be certain about the consequences 
of engaging in bribery. They might worry their counter-
parts could report them and they would face consequenc-
es from the authorities. The previously accepted rules 
of the game are rewritten, and the results are no longer 
predictable. 
In practice, such a shift requires the concerted politi-
cal will of at least a considerable part of the political elite, 
and even with that is difficult. An alternative approach, 
via incremental changes, moves the system to a new 
equilibrium much more slowly, but is still achievable. 
“Once the diffusion of corruption is conceived as a path-
dependent process, then some institutional ‘keys’ could 
be available to reformers to change the direction of the 
path: even small (or even symbolic) interventions at the 
right time and in the right place may start an incremental 
change toward good and transparent governance”.11  As 
a society travels further down that path, former levels of 
corruption become more distant, and harder to return to. 
Tunisian Democracy vs. Corruption 
While the fight against corruption has – for better or 
sometimes for worse – featured prominently in Tunisia’s 
political discourse since the beginning of the transition in 
2011, progress has been mixed. 
Tunisia is one of the few countries that improved in 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions In-
dex 2016, where the MENA region presents an otherwise 
dismal picture.12 Weeks after Tunisia’s first free and fair 
elections, a transitional anti-corruption authority with 
extensive competences was established, known under its 
French acronym INLUCC (Instance nationale de lutte con-
tre la corruption). The profile of the institution and the 
issue of corruption were further raised with the appoint-
ment of the prominent lawyer Chawki Tabib as INLUCC’s 
president in 2016. The authority’s work has subsequently 
become more professionalized, thanks in part to interna-
tional support. Prime Minster Youssef Chahed, who took 
office declaring a “war on corruption”, also increased 
INLUCC’s 2017 budget. 
The government joined the international Open Gov-
ernment Partnership with a promise to increase transpar-
ency, and progress on its commitments can be tracked 
online. The end of 2016 also saw the adoption of a na-
tional anti-corruption strategy. There has been progress 
on legal frameworks, including the introduction of a new 
law that protects whistleblowers. Civil society advocacy 
has contributed significantly to this progress. Indeed, the 
very fact that civil society has the space to play a role in 
holding politicians accountable bodes well for the future. 
Despite these important steps toward greater trans-
parency, the first public battle in the fight against cor-
ruption only occurred in the spring of this year, and 
developments since have sent mixed signals. A sweeping 
crackdown under the state of emergency in May 2017 
led to numerous arrests of corruption suspects. With 
social unrest rocking the country, Chahed cast his move 
as a security issue and stressed in an interview with the 
Tunisian daily La Presse “we are persuaded there is a link 
between smuggling, terrorism financing, cross-border 
activities and also capital flight.”13
Although there are indeed interconnections between 
corruption and terrorism, securitizing the issue politically 
holds risks for the democratic transition as it legitimizes 
exceptional government measures. Placing corruption 
into a security context can undermine the rule of law, an 
essential part of a constitutional democracy. Chahed’s 
statement in an interview on the matter, that “this is an 
exceptional situation and it requires exceptional mea-
sures,”14 indicates how easily the process of securitization 
can lead to the abandonment of due processes. Suspects 
arrested in the first sweep in May 2017 were removed 
from ordinary justice and tried in military courts. This 
mars the process, also because until now the choice of 
targets seems to be selective.15
Chahed’s war on corruption has proven popular among 
voters, and he has since announced further measures.16 
Using strong rhetoric, the prime minister has now tied his 
political fortunes to the fight against corruption. However, 
recent developments do not point toward tougher anti-
corruption efforts.
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Following a significant delay, the parliament passed 
the law to establish INLUCC’s successor, the constitution-
al Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Commission 
in July. This commission is expected to be operational by 
early 2018.  With more clearly delineated competencies 
than its predecessor, its reach will likely be shorter. 
Furthermore, the current INLUCC has found itself un-
der-resourced and understaffed for the thousands of cases 
it has been dealing with. Even where cases were pro-
cessed effectively by INLUCC, the judiciary subsequently 
failed to prosecute them effectively again and again. 
This is striking given the continued impact – both real 
and perceived – of corruption on the country’s progress. 
According to INLUCC’s President Tabib, corruption and 
mismanagement cost Tunisia 2 billion Tunisian Dinars 
(about EUR 700 million) in the area of public procurement 
alone, a sum equivalent to four percentage points of GDP 
growth.17
In the meantime, a cabinet reshuffle spearheaded by 
President Beji Caid Essebsi has brought former members 
of Ben Ali’s regime back into Chahed’s government.18 As 
one of its first legislative projects, the government pushed 
a controversial Administrative Reconciliation Law in 
September 2017. Introduced by President Essebsi over two 
years ago, the bill promises full amnesty for state officials 
who followed orders of corrupt superiors without enrich-
ing themselves, and freedom from prosecution for those 
who return embezzled sums and pay a penalty. Despite 
large protests, the law was passed by the government 
majority in a tense extraordinary session of parliament. 
While amendments to the original bill mean corrupt busi-
nessmen are no longer offered amnesty, critics bemoan 
that the process lacks transparency and undermines ac-
countability as well as the transitional justice work of the 
Truth and Dignity Commission. As a Human Rights Watch 
researcher commented, the law could well be “the final 
blow” to the transition.19
What role for Europe?
The European Union and its member states should make 
use of the current political prominence of the corrup-
tion issue. Europeans and others have already devoted 
considerable financial resources and offered technical 
cooperation in many areas to support Tunisia’s transition. 
International financial support has somewhat softened 
the effects of the economic downturn that followed the 
revolution and the violent attacks in the years since. 
Cooperation with and funding for NGOs has helped civil 
society provide an important check on power since the 
revolution. 
Technical cooperation has improved capacity in a va-
riety of institutions, such as the statistical office and the 
central bank. Through the European Union’s TAIEX in-
strument, there is a well-established tool for the exchange 
of best practices for the public administration. In 2012, the 
EU also launched a multimillion Euro program to sup-
port the judiciary and other good governance projects 
implemented by the Council of Europe. Germany sup-
ports an International Good Governance Academy based 
at the elite École Nationale d’Administration in Tunis. EU 
member states and other donors are also engaged in the 
anti-corruption sector, for instance with INLUCC, where 
capacity building and the equipment of supplies are 
provided. 
It is worth emphasizing that Tunisia has so far been 
quite open to such interventions and that a hospitable 
political environment is a prerequisite for their success.  
Europe and its partners have an interest in a stable and 
effective democratic Tunisia with which they can cooper-
ate on numerous issues including security and migration. 
Given the centrality of corruption in its threat against 
democratic consolidation and its current prominence, the 
EU and its members states should redouble their support 
to anti-corruption efforts in Tunisia. They should also 
invest in making these efforts sustainable and consider 
options in case the political environment changes toward 
one less congenial to anti-corruption cooperation. Ideally, 
their commitment in this matter should reflect a broader 
conceptual shift that puts the struggle against corruption 
at the center of democracy support. By comparison, of the 
33 projects currently supported by the European Endow-
ment for Democracy in Tunisia, only one is concerned 
with corruption.20
Effective anti-corruption measures are likely to be a 
very (cost-) effective contribution they can make with the 
promise of tangible gains for Tunisian citizens. Assuming 
INLUCC President Chawki Tabib’s figures are correct, a 
corruption-free Tunisian economy would have grown by 5 
rather than 1 percent in 2016 and consequently produced 
numerous more jobs. 
A stronger European engagement in anti-corruption 
would also match Tunisians’ expectations and Europe’s 
strengths. In polls, many Tunisians above all demanded 
support in socio-economics and anti-corruption programs 
from the EU.21 Moreover, the EU has extensive experience 
in this area from its enlargement programs. 
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Recommendations
It is unlikely that Tunisia will be able to generate a “big 
bang” against corruption. Europe is equally unable to 
force such a sudden shift, nor would it be in Europe’s 
interest to do so, as it would also risk generating signifi-
cant instability. It is more realistic to pursue incremental 
reforms toward a low-corruption equilibrium. By redou-
bling their efforts in this area now, the EU and its mem-
ber states can support Tunisian progress along this path. 
However, they should also develop policy options in case 
Tunisia takes a different direction. 
 . Support to the Anti-Corruption Authority INLUCC should 
be sustained and carried on to its successor, the indepen-
dent Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Commis-
sion. Similarly, support for the judicial system, including 
the Court of Auditors should be sustained. At the same 
time, EU institutions such as the anti-fraud office OLAF 
and/or its member state counterparts should establish 
institutional partnerships with their respective Tunisian 
counterparts. This would facilitate an ongoing exchange 
of best practices even following the termination of current 
programs and under different political circumstances.  
Tunisia’s anti-corruption authority remains under-
funded, yet it does benefit from donor support. Such 
open support, however, is only possible with approval 
of the Tunisian government. Institutional partnerships 
between Tunisian anti-corruption authorities and their 
European counterparts would be a good way to sustain 
the exchange of best practices beyond the end of cur-
rent projects. As this would be a more technical form 
of cooperation, it also has a better chance of surviving 
changes to the political environment in Tunisia. The 
independent status of OLAF and member state institu-
tions can go some way to alleviating potential concerns 
about interference in Tunisian sovereignty in such a 
changed political climate. 
 . In bilateral discussions, the EU and its member states 
should encourage the Tunisian government to continue, 
expand, and institutionalize its anti-corruption efforts. 
Such measures could become part of the EU-Tunisia Ac-
tion Plan in the framework of the European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP).  
Both Tunisian voters and many international stake-
holders welcome that the Tunisian government has put 
the fight against corruption on the top of its agenda. 
However, critics point out that the government’s ac-
tions have been selective and lack respect for the rule 
of law. Tunisia’s partners should encourage the coun-
try’s government to leave the investigation and trial 
of corrupt officials to the relevant authorities, and to 
resource these sufficiently as well as improve coordi-
nation among them. Concrete steps in that direction 
could be agreed in the new ENP Action Plan, which is to 
succeed the current 2013-2017 one. A committee of the 
EU-Tunisian Association Council could discuss progress 
reports on benchmarks that track efforts on both sides 
of the Mediterranean. 
 . The EU should offer greater flexibility in the negotiations 
for a Deep and Comprehensive Trade Agreement (DCFTA) 
with Tunisia and offer membership in the European Eco-
nomic Area in the longer term. 
Liberal trade regimes reduce opportunities for corrupt 
practices. The sooner the EU and Tunisia adopt such a 
regime for their trade with the DCFTA, the faster it can 
translate into gains in the governance area. Member-
ship in the European Economic Area liberalizes trade 
even more, but it also offers access to structural funds 
that could help Tunisia’s interior regions.22 The EU’s 
willingness to exclude Tunis Carthage Airport from the 
recent Open Skies agreement between the two provides 
a good example of how more liberal trade can coincide 
with concessions to protect strategic sectors. 
 . The EU and its member states should carefully review 
whether individual measures to support Tunisia could 
enable corruption.  
A 2017 report by the European Court of Auditors found 
that EU support on Tunisia was generally well spent.23 
It also briefly noted the persistence of corruption in 
Tunisia. In some cases, international assistance can 
unwittingly contribute to the persistence of corrupt 
networks in a country.24 Political economy assessment 
frameworks with particular consideration of this aspect 
should therefore precede the conception and implemen-
tation of projects in Tunisia. 
Fabian Stroetges is a PhD candidate at Durham Universi-
ty’s School of Government and International Affairs (SGIA), 
UK, where he is also a teaching assistant in international 
relations. He is an alumnus of the DGAP’s MENA program.
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